NOTES
PRESCRIPTION ADRIFT IN A SEA OF
SERVITUDES: POSTMODERNISM AND
THE LOST GRANT
MARK A. CLAWSON
INTRODUCTION

When pressed to defend his subversive statements about Den-

mark, Shakespeare's Hamlet falls back on eminently defensible
territory. He opts for the primacy of personal opinion by acknowledging that "there is nothing either good or bad, but thinking
makes it so. To me it is a prison."' The inherent subjectivity of
this statement appears, at first glance, to bear little comparison to
legal reasoning. Hamlet's words seem to invite conclusions based
on free-wheeling opinion, whereas modem legal minds feel most
comfortable resting their conclusions on more objective rules of
law. This dichotomy of subjective and objective reasoning, however, is the starting point of postmodern analysis.' Postmodern
methods of interpretation, despite their detractors,3 transcend the

1.

WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET act 2, se. 2.

2. See Martin F. Katz, After the Deconstruction: Law in the Age of PostStructuralism, 24 U.W. ONTARIO L. REV., June 1986, at 51.
3. Detractors of postmodern approaches to legal interpretation often attack these
analytical tools as nothing more than mere nihilism, but their discomfort with postmodem
thought is most often based on a profound distaste for what they consider to be radical
ideology. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, Of Law and the River, 34 J.LEGAL EDUC. 222,
227 (1984). (suggesting that universities employing nihilist professors are "more likely to
train crooks than radicals"); Stephen L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE LJ. 821, 822-23
(1985) (lamenting the "delegitimizing assault" on conventional constitutional theory and
suggesting methods of repulsing the assault); Owen M. Fiss, The Death of Law?, 72 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 1 (1986) (arguing that Critical Legal Studies scholars "endanger the
proudest and noblest ambitions of the law"); John Stick, Can Nihilism Be Pragmatic?,
100 HARV. L. REv. 332, 335-38 (1986) (suggesting that "nihilist" approaches such as
Critical Legal Studies "misuse much of the philosophy they attempt to appropriate" and
concluding that they fail to fully discuss politics and should therefore take a more direct
approach to legal doctrines and reasoning).

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[VCol. 43:845

political agendas of individual pressure groups and facilitate a
more thorough comprehension of linguistic, and therefore legal,
structures
Postmodernism may originate in the tension between subjective and objective interpretations, but its application reveals the
complexity hiding beneath this simple dichotomy. It fosters new
interpretations and makes possible an escape from troublesome
formulations previously accepted without question. To make any
use of postmodernism, we should see deconstruction as an analytical tool capable of leading to new insights but incapable of offering conclusions. Furthermore, the conclusion of any deconstructive
exercise is itself subject to attack by the same deconstructive process. A pragmatic, interpretive approach is similarly incapable, in
and of itself, of rendering stable conclusions. It is an interpretive
posture that allows the process of legal reasoning to gain a certain
level of transparency. The approaches presented in this
Note-Jacques Derrida's deconstruction5 and Stanley Fish's pragmatism--represent means, not ends. As analytical tools and interpretive postures, postmodern theories can help one understand the
processes that lie beneath the surface of legal theory and practice.
This Note applies postmodern legal theory to the law of property. Although these analytical tools and interpretive postures
could be applied to any area of the law, the confusing language
and convoluted history of property law, and specifically prescription, provide a perfect context for the application of postmodern
analysis. Because the law of property relies on language as much
as any other area of law,7 different characterizations of ownership
or use, highly abstract concepts themselves, result in the creation
of vastly varied property rights and affect one's ability to utilize
effective remedies. The implications of language determine whether interests vest, leases cease, or owners sue.
4. For a background discussion of postmodern theory, see Peter C. Schanck, The
Only Game in Town: An Introduction to Interpretive Theory, Statutory Construction, and
Legislative Histories, 38 KAN. L. REv. 815 (1990) (presenting contemporary legal interpretive theory in four broad categories); see also Christopher Norris, Law, Deconstruction,
and the Resistance to Theory, 15 .L. & SOC'Y 166, 166 (1988) (noting that interpretive
arguments generally fall into certain categories and "[flor every position adopted by the
partisans of this or that literary theory one can find a corresponding argument developed
in the context of legal interpretation").
5. See infra Section I(B).
6. See infra Section I(C).
7. See infra Part II.
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Within the common law, servitudes developed with particular
reliance on linguistic differentiation! Historically, servitudes arose
as private land use arrangements, but courts eventually developed
a system of easements, equitable servitudes, and real covenants to
escape precedential barriers.' These abstract legal structures allowed parties to significantly alter their rights and burdens solely
on the basis of how they chose to characterize their arrangements.
By allowing continued trespass to develop into a legal property right, the doctrine of prescription" has carved out a particular-

ly interesting niche within this linguistic framework." Because the
trespass of prescriptive user' 2 results in the transfer of property
rights to malfeasors, common law rationales have reluctantly given
an aura of legal legitimacy to bestowal of rights justified only by
pragmatism. The fictional "lost grant" developed as an evidentiary
presumption that, because of long use, an original owner must
have granted the property rights in question to the current possessor." The grant was entirely fictional, however, and the trou-

8. Seen in historical context, it is not difficult to determine why some commentators
reserve special animosity for the common law system. "[T]his is not an area of land law
in which the common law performance deserves admiration. Rather it is one where rigid
categories, silly distinctions, and unreconciled conflicts over basic values have often led to
unhappy results for landowners." CHARLES M. HAAR & LANCE LIEBMAN, PROPERTY
AND LAW 703 (1977).
9. See infra Section II(A).
10. Prescription is the legal doctrine that allows long-continued use (or, in property
parlance, user, see infra note 12) to develop into an incorporeal (or intangible) property
right such as an easement. Adverse possession, on the other hand, is a legal doctrine
that allows possession to become a corporeal (or tangible) property right, i.e. legal ownership of the property. Thus, if property ownership is conceptualized as a bundle of
sticks, prescription leads to the acquisition of a few sticks, whereas adverse possession
yields the whole bundle. See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., THE LAW OF PROPERTY
450-56 (1984).
11. See infra Section II(B). William Holdsworth, along with many other commentators, showed open distaste for the law of prescription. He wrote that "there is no branch
of English law which is in a more unsatisfactory state . . . . [N]o mere restatement can
clear up the muddle which the courts and the Legislature have combined to make of the
law of prescription." 7 WILLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, HISTORY OF THE ENGLISH LAW 352

(1926); see also EMORY WASHBURN, 2 A TREATISE ON THE AMERICAN LAW OF REAL
PROPERTY 33 (5th ed. 1887) (noting that the law of prescription presents a "numerous
and difficult class of cases").
12. "User" is a term of art that implies use satisfying the legal requirements of prescription. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 451.
13. See WILIAM E. BURBY, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF REAL PROPERTY 77
(1965); CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 451.
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blesome proposition of allowing property rights to pass to productive users inevitably resulted in the rewarding of tortious conduct.
The tension between property ownership and transfer to productive users underlies prescription and perhaps explains why the
fictional lost grant has fallen into disfavor.14 Because of this disfavor, courts grapple with other justifications for the law of prescription, such as analogy to adverse possession. 5 Modem minds
view fictions as excess theoretical baggage that detract from the
smoothness of a mechanical approach, but modem views fail to
appreciate the incongruence of their own mechanical language. A
postmodern analysis of the lost grant doctrine and prescription
reveals that a fiction by any other name is still a fiction. Furthermore, postmodern analysis of the lost grant doctrine and the mechanical tests advocated in its place reveals that the lost grant
doctrine, despite modem attempts to circumvent it, served as an
adequate, if not a more straightforward, arbiter of competing
interests. As a metaphor, the fictional lost grant implies that the
transfer of property rights through prescription is also fictitious.
Postmodernism reveals that the mechanical rules of adverse possession avoid metaphors and symbols yet accomplish the same
"fictional" transfer of property rights.
Part I of this Note presents and analyzes postmodern concepts
of deconstruction and interpretive theory. Part II summarizes the
lengthy history of servitudes and prescription before proceeding to
an analysis of the confusion that surrounds the lost grant doctrine.
Part III uses the interpretive tools of postmodernism to analyze
why modem courts and commentators have removed the fictional
lost grant from its place as the theoretical basis for the legal doctrine of prescription and replaced it with mechanical approaches
borrowed from adverse possession. Deconstructing the arguments
against "prescription by analogy to lost grant," this Note shows
that they apply equally well to "prescription by analogy to adverse
possession"-neither rationale stands on a firm conceptual founda-

14. See infra Section HI(B); see also BURBY, supra note 13, at 77 ("The fiction of a
'lost grant' has, in general, been discarded."); CUNNINGHAM ET AL, supra note 10, at
451 ("Lost grant is part of the historical development of American prescription law, but
that is all.... Except for historical purposes, discussions of the subject should drop out
of the legal literature.").
15. See, eg., Warlick v. Rome Loan & Fin. Co., 22 S.E.2d 61 (Ga. 1942); Plaza v.
Flak, 81 A.2d 137 (NJ. 1951); DiLeo v. Pecksto Holding Corp., 109 N.E.2d 600 (N.Y.
1952).
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tion. This insight reveals that the disdain for the lost grant doctrine may conceal intellectual insecurity about our conception of
property ownership. In "reality," there was no grant, but postmodem analysis reveals another, equally valid, "reality"-the modem conception of property ownership is a fictional construct just
like the lost grant.
I. POSTMODERNISM
Any discussion of meaning or understanding in the legal context begins with the assumption that legal endeavor hinges on
issues of interpretation. 6 Just as in literary circles, "jurists [have]
become factioned over a debate represented by the dichotomy of
objective and subjective."'1 7 This interpretive debate tends to
"polarise between those who believe in the authority of origins,
intentions, or historical wairrant, and those who argue for a more
liberal approach to questions of legal precedent, regarding law as
a text open to reinterpretation in the light of changing social and
political realities."' 8
While this debate rages, with individual commentators taking
refuge behind party lines, students and practitioners of the law
may wonder about the importance, even the relevance, of understanding postmodem theory. Simply stated, postmodernism opens
up new avenues of thought and facilitates new interpretive possibilities by allowing subjective interpretations equal footing alongside well-entrenched objectivist viewpoints. That which appears
cryptic can unexpectedly become transparent when viewed through
a postmodem lens.

16. Schanck, supra note 4, at 815 & n2 ("[W]hoever hath an absolute Authority to
interpret any written, or spoken Laws; it is He, who is truly the Law-giver, to all Intents
and Purposes; and not- the Person who first wrote, or spoke them.") (quoting BENJAMIN
B. HOADLY, THE NATURE OF THE KINGDOM, OR CHURCH, OF CHRIST 12 (1717), reprinted in JOHN CHIPMAN GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 102 (2d ed.

1921)).
17. Katz, supra note 2, at 51 ("Broadly and superficially stated, the [objective] is
concerned with restricting the scope of legitimate interpretations to the letter of the text,
allowing the text to identify or define itself, while the [subjective] is considered to refer
to one party's or one reader's personal or private understanding of the text.").
18. Norris, supra note 4, at 166.
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Postmodernism's PhilosophicalBackground

The term "postmodernism" itself encompasses a number of
different theories and practices. Sometimes terms such as
"structuralism," "poststructuralism," and "deconstruction" are
bandied about as if synonymous,

9

but their differences become

apparent when one views them in historical contexts.
Most often, advocates of radical political thought have invoked postmodern ideas to undermine "beliefs still prevalent in
(especially American) culture but derived from the Enlightenment."' The humanists of the Enlightenment placed human insights, principally those of authors, at the peak of any interpretive
pyramid because humanist thought "presupposed a view of language as something capable of grasping reality., 21 The structuralists, on the other hand, later argued that, instead of an author's
language reflecting reality, the structure of language actually produced reality; meaning is not determined by the individual but by
the system governing the individual.' At the center of structuralism was a "scientific ambition to discover the codes, the rules,
the systems, which underlie all human social and cultural practices."

19. See, eg., Thomas C. Heller, Structuralism and Critique, 36 STAN. L. REV. 127,
155 (1984) ("[P]oststructuralism must incorporate structuralism's deconstruction."); Cheah

Pheng, The Law of/as Rape: Poststructuralismand the Framing of the Legal Text, 9 LAW
CONTEXT 117, 118-19 (1991) (discussing the "vulgarisation" in academic usage of "poststructuralism" and "deconstruction"); Michel Rosenfeld, Deconstruction and Legal Interpretation: Conflict, Indeterminacy and the Temptations of the New Legal Formalism, 11
CARDOZO L. REv. 1211, 1211-12 (1990) (referring to the "multifaceted dimensions" of
the Critical Legal Studies movement through an overbroad use of "deconstruction").
20. Jane Flax, Postmodernism and Gender Relations in Feminist Theory, in FEMINIST
THEORY IN PRACTnCE AND PROCESS 51, 54 (Micheline R. Malson et al. eds., 1989). Flax
lists holdover beliefs from the Enlightenment that postmodernism seeks to throw into
doubt. The existence of a stable, coherent self that is capable of using universal reason
to reach conclusions grounded in science, and therefore truth, is central to these holdover
beliefs. Implicit in these ideas is a view that, "[jiust as the right use of reason can result
in knowledge that represents the real, so, too, language is merely the medium in and
through which such representation occurs." Id. at 54-55.
21.

RAMAN SELDEN, A READER'S GUIDE TO CONTEMPORARY LITERARY THEORY

66 (2d ed. 1989). Selden further notes that humanist critics thought of language "as a reflection of either the writer's mind or the world as seen by the writer. In a sense the
writer's language was hardly separable from his or her personality." Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. (emphasis omitted). Discussing structuralism, Christopher Norris has written
that
[t]here is simply no access to knowledge except by way of language and other,
related orders of representation. Reality is carved up in various ways according
to the manifold patterns of sameness and difference which various languages
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With time, however, poststructuralist thinkers "[sought] to

deflate the scientific pretensions of structuralism"2' 4 while simulta-

neously continuing to build on its foundation. Whereas
structuralism had noted the inherent nature of language to vary
between words ("signifiers") and concepts ("signifieds"),
poststructuralism emphasized the unstable nature of all signification. It postulated that language was not a unitary structure with
two sides' but rather a "momentary 'fix' between two moving
layers."2 6 Thus, poststructuralists believe that the structuralist attempt to "master the text and to open its secrets ... is vain be-

cause there are unconscious, or linguistic, or historical forces which
cannot be mastered. The signifier floats away from the signified .. .. ,27 This unstable nature of language forms the central

tenet in poststructuralist theory.
B. Deconstruction

Rather than attempting to give answers, the nature of
poststructuralism is to ask questions by noting the differences
between what a text actually says and what it purports to say.'
Against this backdrop, deconstruction has developed as a "means
of demonstrating that what appears to be the 'correct' or most

defensible interpretation is not that at all, that there is always
more than one plausible and justifiable interpretation"29 of any
provide. This basic relativity of thought and meaning . . . is the starting-point of
structuralist theory.
CHRISTOPHER NoRRIS, DECONSTRUCrION 5 (rev. ed. 1990).
24. SELDEN, supra note 21, at 70 ("If structuralism was heroic in its desire to master
the world of man-made signs, poststructuralism is comic and anti-heroic in its refusal to
take such claims seriously.").
25. Selden observes that structuralist theorists such as Ferdinand de Saussure viewed
signifier and signified as two sides of one coin; however, they also realized that
there is no necessary connection between signifier and signified. Sometimes a
language will have one word (signifier) for two concepts (signifieds): in English
"sheep" is the animal and "mutton" the meat; French has only one word for
both signifieds ("mouton"). It is as though the various languages carve up the
world of things and ideas into different concepts (signifieds) on the one hand,
and different words (signifiers) on the other.
Id. For a general discussion of Saussure's linguistic theories, see FERDINAND DE
SAUSsuRE, COURSE IN GENERAL LINGUISTICS (Wade Baskin trans., 1974).
26. SELDEN, supra note 21, at 71.
27. Id. at 109. Of course, this instability leads directly to the principal criticism of
poststructuralist theory: it cannot lead to a single definitive interpretation because every
conclusion is equally subject to attack. See Schanck, supra note 4, at 829.
28. See SELDEN, supra note 21, at 109-10.
29. Schanck, supra note 4, at 821. Schanck notes that deconstruction, a post-
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text. The practice of deconstruction finds its origin in the writings
of the French philosopher Jacques Derrida.30 Derrida is interested in the congruence and incongruence between the signs one uses
to convey meaning and what one actually intends to say.31 Christopher Norris, a scholar of literary theory, has observed that
deconstruction terminology has been used in two distinct senses.
On the one hand, it is used to imply a free-wheeling desire to
"trash" tradition in the name of "pet ideological agenda." On the
other hand it implies, less prejudicially, a method of closely reading texts to see how they contradict themselves and "undermine
more traditional, naive ways of reading."'3 2
Deconstruction is not, in the words of one legal scholar, "simply a fancy way of sticking out your tongue, but a practice that
raises important philosophical issues for legal thinkers."33 Since
deconstruction should be viewed as a practice, rather than a philosophical position, J.M. Balkin, a law professor interested in the
application of deconstruction to legal issues, has identified two
issues of analytical relevance to legal practitioners: the inversion of
hierarchies and the liberation of the text from the author.'

structuralist theory, is often classified as a school of postmodern philosophy. He notes
further that poststructuralism, although it contains many elements of structuralism, has
evolved beyond and also in opposition to some basic tenets of structuralism. Id.
Poststructuralists and postmodernists "generally reject the idea of a single textual meaning, rational understanding, objective knowledge, the autonomous individual, universal
morality, and any other overarching or totalizing theory." Id. at 821 n.34.
30. See, eg., JACQUES DERRIDA, DISSEMINATION (Barbara Johnson trans., 1981);
JACQUES DERRIDA, MARGINS OF PHILOSOPHY (Alan Bass trans., 1982); JACQUES
DERRIDA, OF GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri C. Spivak trans., 1976); JACQUES DERRIDA,
WRITING AND DIFFERENCE (Alan Bass trans., 1978).
31. J.M. Balkin, Deconstructive Practice and Legal Theory, 96 YALE W. 743, 744
(1987).
32. NORRIS, supra note 23, at 137.
33. Balkin, supra note 31, at 744. Balkin notes three reasons why lawyers should find
interest in deconstructive techniques.
First, deconstruction provides a method for critiquing existing legal doctrines; in
particular, a deconstructive reading can show how arguments offered to support
a particular rule undermine themselves, and instead, support an opposite rule.
Second, deconstructive techniques can show how doctrinal arguments are informed by and disguise ideological thinking ....
Third, deconstructive techniques offer both a new kind of interpretive strategy and a critique of conventional interpretations of legal texts.
34. Id. at 746.
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1. The Inversion of Hierarchies. The first of these tools- of
deconstructive practice, the inversion of hierarchies, involves the

"identification of hierarchical oppositions, followed by a temporary
reversal." 35 For example, hierarchies are established- when certain'
ideas are accepted as more valid than others. These ideas are then
said to be in opposition, and a deconstructive reversal changes the
hierarchy. The objective of this exercise is not to establish a new,
conclusive interpretation, but to examine what happens when the
conventional arrangement is reversed.36 Derrida believes that insights come when the privileging of hierarchies is reversed. If A is
given certain qualities, such as being the general rule-simple,
normal, or true-and B is given the opposing qualities of being
the exception-complex, abnormal, or false-then a deconstructionist reversal will show that the qualities assigned to A are true
of B and the qualities assigned to B are true of A.37 Thus, "A's
privileged status is an illusion, for A depends upon B as much as
B depends upon A,

...

[and B actually] stands in relation to A

much -like we thought A stood in relation to B."38 The aim of
this exercise is to observe A and B as we never have before; this
additional insight comes through a process of "intellectual discovery, which operates by wrenching us from our accustomed modes
of thought."39

35. Id. Balkin uses Derrida's favorite example to describe inversion.
[If the history of Western civilization has been marked by a bias in favor of
speech over writing we should investigate what it would be like if writing were
more important than speech. We should attempt to see speech as a kind of
writing, as ultimately parasitic upon writing ... rather than the other way
around. In so doing, we reverse the privileged position of speech over writing,
and temporarily substitute a new priority.
Id.
36. See, eg., NORRIS, supra note 23, at 31 (explaining that deconstruction "seeks to
undo both a given order of priorities and the very system of conceptual opposition that
makes the order possible"); Balkin, supra note 31, at 746-47 (explaining that the point of
deconstruction is "not to establish a new conceptual bedrock, but rather to investigate
what happens when the given, 'common sense' arrangement is reversed"); Schanck, supra
note 4, at 823 (suggesting that deconstructionists do not reverse hierarchies to create a
new, correct interpretation).
37. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 747.
38. Id.
39. Id. "[D]econstruction is not simply a strategic reversal of categories which otherwise remain distinct and unaffected. It seeks to undo both a given order of priorities and
the very system of conceptual opposition that makes that order possible." NoRRIS, supra
note 23, at 31.
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Balkin writes of the tendency to relate the most immediate,
perceptible concepts with reality and truth through discussions of.
the "privileging of 'presence' in Derrida's sense of the word."'
When this reliance on immediacy and perception is seen as a
philosophical bias, one understands why language is the central
object of study for deconstructionists. This bias, referred to as the
"metaphysics of presence,"' is inherently found within language
systems because language relies on immediacy and perception. For
individuals to communicate, their interpretations of language must
correspond. This correspondence is easier if the concepts are immediate and easily perceptible, but this fact does not mean that
immediacy and perception always correspond to truth. Thus, the
study of language is, for deconstructionists, a means of uncovering
philosophical bias. In the legal context, rules and decisions result
from distinguishing the correct, and thus legal, from the incorrect
and illegal. Therefore, the foundational concepts of law, inasmuch
as they are considered most valid by the legal community, result
from the inherent privileging of certain concepts over others.
Several properties of language systems take on a great deal of
importance in deconstructive practice. Because words, or signs, can
be made in multiple contexts without destroying their meaning,
communication through language is possible.42 Language systems
rely on different signs for communication, and the difference between them distinguishes their meaning and interpretation. In
deconstructionist terminology, "words carry the 'traces' of other
words from which they are distinguished and in opposition to
' When the hierarchy of more
which they possess intelligibility."43
basic terms and less basic terms is deconstructed to show that the
terms are mutually dependent, the relationship of fundamental
dependence is referred to as difflrance.4 These principles suggest
a new way of understanding how humans grasp abstract ideas.

40. Balkin, supra note 31, at 748; see also NORRIS, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing
the "endless displacement of meaning" that is present in language and "everywhere disguised by the illusory 'metaphysics of presence"').
41. Balldn, supra note 31, at 748.
42. See SELDEN, supra note 21, at 52-53. Iterability, a property of signs in linguistic
scholarship, implies the ability to make a sign in multiple contexts and therefore makes
communication through words possible. Balkin, supra note 31, at 748.
43. Balkin, supra note 31, at 750; see also NORRIS, supra note 23, at 29 (discussing
the "network of relays and differential 'traces' which can never be grasped by the individual speaker").
44. Balkin, supra note 31, at 752; SELDEN, supra note 21, at 88.
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Trace and diff~rance intimate that, rather than merely holding an
immediately perceptible idea before us in our minds, we hold the

idea and its opposite.
When deconstructive reversals show that the reasons given for
privileging one term over another actually advocate privileging the
second term, the reversal "ungrounds" the preferred conception.4'

Deconstructionists use this concept to demonstrate the nature of
opposing arguments to "undo themselves."' After extensive argument and careful analysis, "[e]very signified is actually a signifier
in disguise."'4 7 Demonstrating how arguments for a preferred conception actually unground that conception reveals the power of
deconstructive theory. Widely supported conclusions, and even
entire intellectual traditions, have been called into doubt through

the application of deconstructive methods.'
2. The Liberation of Text from Author. Balkin's second tool
of deconstructive practice, the liberation of text from author, relies
on the most simple paradigm of legal interpretation. According to
this paradigm, correct interpretations grasp the author's intent,
whereas incorrect interpretations miss the author's intent.49 Cer-

tain readings are therefore privileged over other readings. Deconstructionists find the hierarchy of acceptable readings subject to
deconstruction and, thus, to change."0 Accordingly, new interpre45. Balkin, supra note 31, at 755; see also Schanck, supra note 4, at 823
("Deconstruction is an interminable process of undermining proposed interpretations.").
46. See Balkin, supra note 31, at 755-58.
47. Id. at 760. This is the point at which critics accuse postmodernism of leading to
nihilism because the theories seem to deny the possibility of objective truth. Derrida's
critique, however subtly, relies on a conception of truth that is unavoidably obscured by
interpretation because it argues that our methods of reaching for truth are hopelessly
inadequate. Id. at 760-61. Balkin asserts that, within the logocentric framework of Western thought (constructed on our notions of presence and its primacy), signifiers can only
imperfectly represent signifieds. Thus,
Derrida does not deny the existence of objective truth as much as he affirms
the interpretive character of our attempts to comprehend truth. Our
"truth"-the conceptual apparatus we create to explain the world to ourselves-is only a sign or metaphor for an endless succession of still other signs
and metaphors, and we have forgotten that it is only that. Thus, the Real Truth
seems always beyond our grasp, outside the dominant conceptual apparatus,
because that apparatus is necessarily always incomplete and capable of further
supplementation.
Id. at 761.
48. SELDEN, supra note 21, at 92.
49. Balkin, supra note 31, at 772.
50. See Schanck, supra note 4, at 823.
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tations of legal texts constantly develop. Some of these interpretations, however, are later seen as misreadings because they "are
subjected to new interpretations as we read them over and over
again in different factual, historical, and political contexts."'"
A deconstructionist concept called the "free play of text"-the
"habit of our words to burst the seams of our intentions and to
produce their own kind of logic" 52 -makes reinterpretation possible. Language inevitably contains a divergence between an
author's intention and the actual signs and metaphors of a text
because "[Ilegal texts, like other texts, often present later readers
with new meanings, connections, and difficulties that their creators
did not contemplate. These meanings are uncovered by the interpretations of successive readers in different historical and cultural
contexts." 53 Professor Balkin has observed that, although the rule
of law appears to depend on determinate meaning and privileged
interpretations, after deconstructive analysis, "[i]t is the text as
read, and not the text as written, that becomes the law."'54 Indeed, deconstruction reveals the tension between attempts to seek
origins and the indeterminacy one finds within the free play of
text.5
Deconstruction, which "by its very nature is an analytic tool
and not a synthetic one," 56 reveals the inconsistencies of privi51. Balkin, supra note 31, at 775.
52. Id. at 780. In discussing the free play of text, Balkin writes,
The structural precondition of the sign is its ability to break free from the
author, and to mean other than what the author meant. The very act of
"meaning" something creates a chasm between the sign and the producer's
intention. This detachability makes iterability, and thus intersubjective meaning,
possible. The repetition of the sign in the new context is simultaneously a re,lation of identity and difference; the repeated sign is syntactically identical, yet
semantically different. The result is that the text, as it is repeatedly understood,
takes on a life of its own in a relation of diffrrance with the person who
"meant" it.
Id. at 780; see also SELDEN, supra note 21, at 52-53, 90 (discussing the linguistic theory
of signs, signifiers, and signifieds, as well as the ability of language to break free from
context).
53. Balkin, supra note 31, at 778.
54. Id. at 782.
55. See Rosenfeld, supra note 19, at 1212. Balkin points out that the purpose of
deconstructive practice is "not to 'establish that any interpretation of a text is acceptable,
but that the yearning for originary meaning in the simple theory of interpretation is
incomplete and cannot serve as a foundation for interpretation." Balkin, supra note 31, at
785.
56. Balkin, supra note 31, at 786; see also NORRIS, supra note 23, at 31
("Deconstruction is therefore an activity of reading which remains closely tied to the
texts it interrogates, and which can never set up independently as a self-enclosed system
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leged and excluded concepts. Deconstructive practice itself, however, cannot posit conclusions nor replace the hierarchies that it exposes. To lead toward conclusions, the results of deconstructive
practice require interpretation. Acceptance of an interpretation
requires that- an interpretive community be persuaded.
C. Interpretive Communities
Other postmodern thinkers, such as Stanley Fish, also apply
their interpretive theories to both literature and law.57 One such
theory is the conception that interpretation is both highly individuated and constrained by the interpreter's 'community. 5" Fish's
writings have been referred to as "reader-oriented theory" 59 in
the context of literary criticism and "conventionalism" 6 or "pragmatism"61 in the context of law.62 Fish's ideas build on his
much-cited statement that "all activity is irremediably interpretive." According to Fish, the context within which one reads a
text, that is, the structure of beliefs innate to those who read it,
determines the text's meaning.' Objectivity in interpretation is

of operative concepts.").
57.

See, eg., STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY (1989).

58. But see infra note 66 and accompanying text.
59. See SELDEN, supra note 21, at 124-26.
60. See Schanck, supra note 4, at 833-43. Schanck notes that "the term
'conventionalism' is not a completely satisfactory designation, but it seems more closely
descriptive of the theory than overly broad alternatives such as poststructuralism,
postmodernism, antifoundationalism, and antiessentialism or inaccurate alternatives, such as
philosophical idealism and pragmatism." Id. at 883 n.85.
61. See Norris, supra note 4, at 168-69.
62. Fish, like other postmodern theorists, has been amply criticized. See, e.g., Drucilla
Cornell, "Convention" and Critique, 7 CARDOZO L. REv. 679 (1986); Ronald Dworkin,
My Reply to Stanley Fish (and Walter Benn Michaels): Please Don't Talk About Objectivity Any More, in Ti POLIcS OF INTERPRETATION 287 (WJ.T. Mitchell ed., 1983);
Owen M. Fiss, Conventionalism, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 177 (1985); David Luban, Fish V.
Fish or, Some Realism About Idealism, 7 CARDOzO L. REV. 693 (1986); Michael S.
Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modem Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN. L.
REV. 871, 905-17 (1989); Pierre Schlag, Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. LJ. 37 (1987).
63. FISH, supra note 57, at 436.
64. Professor Fish has written that
interpretations rest on other interpretations, or, more precisely, on assumptions-about what is possible, necessary, telling, essential, and so on--so deeply
held that they are not thought of as assumptions at all; . . . the activities they
make possible and the facts they entail seem not to be matters of opinion or
debate, but a part of the world.
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impossible, according to Fish, because the interpretive community-the structure of beliefs espoused by the text's interpreters-determines textual interpretation and even textual content. 65
However, Fish's belief in interpretive constraint balances
against this subjectivity. He sees constraint on interpretation as
characteristic of the interpretive community, rather than of the
text itself.' Consequently, an infinite number of interpretations
of a given text are possible, but the conventions of an interpretive
community will constrain those interpretations that are ultimately
seen as valid and acceptable.
Several propositions result from this analytical framework.
First, because. interpretive constraint is a function of the structure
of assumptions the interpretive community holds, it follows that a
change in these assumptions will change the nature of the interpretive constraint. Second, because acts of persuasion can change
the structure of beliefs, acts of persuasion can result in a change
in interpretation.67 Over time, a new interpretation becomes
transformed from a possible interpretation into an accepted fact.'
Within an interpretive community, smaller subcommunities
may disagree about particular interpretations, but their debate
'69
takes place within the confines of an "undisputed context.

Stanley Fish, Short People Got No Reason to Live: Reading Irony, DAEDELUS, Winter
1983, at 175, 190.

65. See Katz, supra note 2, at 54 ("[T]he place where sense is made or not made is
the reader's mind rather than the printed page.") (quoting STANLEY FISH, IS THERE A
TEXT IN THIS CLASS? 37 (1980)).
66. In explaining his conception of interpretive constraint, Fish argues that
it is neither the case that interpretation is constrained by what is obviously and
unproblematically "there," nor the case that interpreters, in the absence of such
constraints, are free to read into a text whatever they like .... Interpreters are
constrained by their tacit awareness of what is possible and not possible to do,
what is and is not a reasonable thing to say, and what will and will not be
heard as evidence in a given enterprise; and it is within those same constraints
that they see and bring others to see the shape of the documents to whose
interpretation they are committed.
Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang: Interpretationin the Law and in Literary Criticism, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 201, 211 (1982).

67. Katz, supra note 2, at 54.
68. Fish writes,
[Unassailable facts are unassailable only because an act of persuasion has been
so successful that it is no longer regarded as one, and instead has the status of
a simple assertion about the world. In short, there are no facts that are not the
products of persuasion, and therefore no facts that stand to the side of its
operations.
Fish, supra note 64, at 189.
69. Katz, supra note 2, at 56 (citing Walter Benn Michaels, Against Formalism: The
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Thus, one can say that "acts of persuasion are conducted with the
contents of undisputed contexts on the contents of what we can
call disputed contexts."'7 If the acts of persuasion succeed, the
interpretive community will accept the interpretation offered by
one subcommunity, and that interpretation will become a part of
the larger community's undisputed context.
II. A SEA OF SERVITUDES

Perhaps no area of the law appears to differ more from the
avant garde pretensions of postmodernism than the law of
servitudes, an ancient tradition that bears the lasting marks of its
confusing genealogy. Servitudes have existed in a number of contexts,7' but the most disorienting servitudes comprise the convo-

luted system of easements, real covenants, and equitable
servitudes.' This system has been called "the most complex and
archaic body of American property law remaining in the twentieth
century."'7 3 In its historical development, servitude law displays
the confusion that still marks these incorporeal interests.
A.

The Context

Modem servitude law grew out of the medieval system of
common fields that allowed communal decisions in matters of land
Autonomous Text in Legal and Literary Interpretation, 1 POETICS TODAY 23, 31 (1979)).
Undisputed contexts are the building blocks with which discourse is constructed. We use
these words, about whose meaning we have no disagreement, to make arguments about
disputed concepts. See iL
70. Id.
71. In the past, servitudes such as profits were quite common. Easements, real covenants, and equitable servitudes make up the principal servitudes common to contemporary
American law. See CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 10, at 435.

72. The following statement ranks among the more denigrating references to servitude law:
[T]he law in this area is an unspeakable quagmire. The intrepid soul who ventures into this formidable wilderness never emerges unscarred. Some, the smarter ones, quickly turn back to take up something easier like the income taxation
of trusts and estates. Others, having lost their way, plunge on and after weeks
of effort emerge not far from where they began, clearly the worse for wear. On
looking back they see a trail they thought they broke obscured with
foulsmelling waters and noxious weeds. Few willingly take up the challenge
again.
EDWARD H. RABIN, FUNDAMENTALS OF MODERN REAL PROPERTY LAW 480 (2d ed.

1982).
73. Susan F. French, Toward a Modem Law of Servitudes: Reweaving the Ancient
Strands, 55 S. CAL. L. REV. 1261, 1261 (1982).
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use.74 The fights accorded under this system, called profits d
prendre, -allowed community members to put the land to its most
efficient use, including entering the land and taking commodities,
such as timber, game, or minerals, which were considered part of
it.7' The evolution of common fields into fenced fields and of
shared pastures into consolidated farms brought on more complex
legal structures to maintain the increasingly complex demands for
land use; easements developed as a type of incorporeal hereditament. 76 Positive easements became a means of allowing a servient
owner to grant a neighbor the right to enter and perform positive
acts on the servient land. Negative easements-judicially
disfavored because negative duties seem better suited to personal
contracts than property rights-were limited to the four categories
of light, air, support, and interference with an artificial stream of
water 7
Frustration with the inability to enforce negative obligations at
law resulted in efforts to create such burdens, through contractual
means, which led to the development of property rights characterized as real covenants.78 The burden enforceable through a real
covenant was restricted by the requirements, laid out in Spencer's
Case,79 that there be intent to bind successors of the covenantor,
that the covenant "touch and concern" the land, and that privity' of estate exist for a burden to run at law."' The functional

74. See JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 788-91 (3d ed. 1993).

75. Id. at 788-89. Dukeminier and Krier note that profits were viewed as the "common wealth." Id. at 788. Distinguishing the particular requirements of profits and easements still creates conceptual difficulties in the modem British common law. See, e.g.,
A.H. Hudson, Problems in Prescription and Lost Modem Grant, 1986 CONVEYANCER &
PROP. LAW., Sept.-Oct., at 356, 356-60 (analyzing a 1984 New South Wales case on prescription and "lost modem grant").
76. See DUKEMNIER & KRIER, supra note 74, at 790. "Incorporeal hereditaments" is
a collective name for intangible (incorporeal) rights that descended as real property to
the primogenitary heir (hereditaments), rather than as personal property to be divided
among all the heirs. Medieval society distinguished between property that would descend
to the oldest son and property that would be divided among, all the children. Id. at 790
n.7.
77. See id.at 851; Uriel Reichman, Toward a Unified Concept of Servitudes, 55 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1177, 1187 n.42 (1982).
78. See DUKEMINMER & KRIER, supra note 74, at 855-59; Reichman, supra note 77,
at 1212-18.
79. 77 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
80. Privity later became a more complex notion encompassing both horizontal privity
(the relationship between original parties to the covenant) and vertical privity (the relationship between original parties and their assignees). See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra
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equivalent of negative easements eventually arose, however, in the
doctrine of equitable servitudes.' The decision in Tulk v.
Moxhay 83 established that, regardless of a covenant's enforceability at law, successors to the covenantors are bound by equity if
there is intent for the promise to run, successors to the burden
have notice, and the covenant fulfills the "touch and concern"
requirement.' These rights are enforceable only through equitable remedies, unlike real covenants, which are enforceable at
law.
Linguistic differentiation is the principal difference among the
very similar concepts of easements, real covenants, and equitable
servitudes because how one chooses to label the obligation determines which rights are preserved and how they are enforced.
Through quirks of history, the characterization we give to an abstract notion of property may have enormous implications for the
nature of the rights or obligations created. A variance of one
word may determine the enforceability of a covenant and, therefore, the potential use and value of property. Additionally, the law
is full of distinctions based on language that have outlasted their
necessity.' Although language always underlies legal discourse,
this archaic framework of servitude law provides a uniquely convoluted backdrop for the debate and proposed modification focused
on the law of prescription. Within this linguistic context, prescription-the process of acquiring the right to use but not possess
note 74, at 857-59; Reichman, supra note 77, at 1218-25.
81. See Spencer's Case, 77 Eng. Rep. at 72.
82. See DUKEMINIER & KRIER, supra note 74, at 854. "The hostility to negative
[easements] was ultimately overcome . . . at a substantial cost in needless complexity."
JESSE DUKEMINIER & JAMES E. KRIER, PROPERTY 874 (2d ed. 1988); see also
Reichman, supra note 77, at 1225-27 (examining the historical development through
which "equitable servitudes became the equity version of negative easements").
83. 41 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
84. See id.
85. Dukeminier and Krier note that the "traditi6nal difference between real covenants and equitable servitudes relates to the remedy sought. The remedy for breach of a
real covenant is damages in a suit at law. The remedy for breach of an equitable servitude is an injunction or enforcement of a lien in a suit in equity." DUKEMINIER &
KRIER, supra note 74, at 865.
86. Proposals for servitude reform often advocate merging the distinct doctrines into
a larger concept of servitudes. See, e.g., French, supra note 73, at 1261; Reichman, supra
note 77, at 1179. These proposals, however, also have their detractors. See, e.g., Gregory
S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 CORNELL L. REV. 883,
883-85 (1988); Stewart E. Sterk, Freedom from Freedom of Contract: The Enduring Value
of Servitude Restrictions, 70 IowA L. REv. 615, 616-17 (1985).
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property-provides a well-established means of securing legally
coerced property transfer. The theoretical justification for this
practice, however, is anything but well-established.
B. The History of Prescription
Although some, if not most, commentators think it "orthodox
legal doctrine"' to consider the acquisition of prescriptive rights
by analogy to adverse possession,' prescription by analogy to the
fictional lost grant, a transfer of property rights premised on a
nonexistent grant that has subsequently been "lost," survives as an
exceedingly difficult doctrine to replace.89 The doctrine survives
because of the confused history of prescription as it was developed
in England and as it was adopted in America.
As early as the thirteenth century, the legal historian Henry
de Bracton observed that, "if there has been any user extending
over considerable time, exercised in peace, without any interruption and not by violence or stealth or by virtue of a request...
the person enjoying the right cannot be ousted of it, at all events
without the judgment of the court."' This pronouncement came
at a time, prior to the conception of any doctrine based on the
lost grant, when the doctrine of customary usage accorded rights
that had existed "time out of mind" to any individual who exercised the right. Prescription was a derivative doctrine that allowed
individuals the same right to make a property interest in land use
that had been exercised from time immemorial legally enforceable. 9'
CURTIS J. BERGER, LAND OWNERSHIP AND USE 524 (3d ed. 1983).
88. In the parlance of the common law, corporeal interests may be acquired by possession, whereas incorporeal interests may be acquired by user. Scholarly justification for
these transfers generally falls into two categories: first, adverse possession or prescription
may bar the owner's remedy and thus leave the disseisor or prescriber with rightful possession or user, second, long user (or, in America, possession) may raise a presumption
of a grant that has subsequently been lost. See William B. Stoebuck, The Fiction of Presumed Grant, 15 KAN. L. REV. 17, 17 (1966).
89. See generally R.D. Cox, Adverse Possession and the Presumption of Title, 11
MEM. ST. U. L. REv. 1 (1980) (discussing the historical development of the presumption
and its incorporation into American law, although noting that the presumption is based
on a misunderstanding of the English common law); Stoebuck, supra note 88 (discussing
the theoretical confusion surrounding prescription and the doctrine of lost grant).
90. BERGER, supra note 87, at 524-25 (citation omitted).
91. Customary usage would justify, for example, the right of an entire village to
privileges of common pasture in certain parcels of land. Prescription, on the other hand,
would award one individual a right to pasture. See Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 18-19
87.
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To establish a prescriptive property right prior to 1275, a
claimant had to assert that user of the incorporeal property had

continued since beyond the memory of living witnesses or since
the Norman Conquest of Britain in 1 0 66 .0I In 1275, the Statute
of Westminster' fixed the date of a writ of right94 as Richard

I's accession to the British throne in 1189. Within two hundred
years, this date became known as "the limit of English legal memory,"' and a successful prescriptive claim required proof of user
back to 1189.96
In 1540, Parliament modified the period of limitations on the
writ of right to sixty years, but the courts failed to modify the
period for prescriptive claims to match this shorter period.' The
courts instead chose to create two presumptions. First, proof of
user as far as living memory inferred user all the way back to
1189. This presumption could be defeated by a showing that user
did not exist at some time since 1189. Second, to avoid the inconvenience of searching for an octogenarian with a particularly fertile memory, courts created a presumption that there had been, at
some past time, a grant of the incorporeal interest.9" The time
period necessary to raise this presumptive inference was eventually
set at twenty years. 99

(citing 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *263; EDWARD COKE, FIRST INSTITuTES *113b).
92. See 2 FREDERICK POLLOCK & FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, THE HISTORY OF THE

ENGLISH LAW 142 (2d ed. 1898) (user pled back to the Conquest); Stoebuck, supra note
88, at 19 (citing COKE, supra note 91, at *115b) (user "beyond the memory of living witnesses").
93. 3 Edw. 1, ch. 39.
94. A writ of right was grantable by right, rather than by prerogative, and "lay for
one who had the right of property, against another who had the right of possession and
the actual occupation." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1611 (6th ed. 1990). A writ of right
secured the return of one's real property. Incorporeal interests were secured through
writs "in the nature of a writ of right." Id.
95. See Angus & Co. v. Dalton, 3 Q.B.D. 85, 104 (1877) (discussing this concept).
Thus, any contrary use of the property prior to the accession of Richard I was beyond
the limit of English legal memory and, therefore, irrelevant.
96. Id.
97. Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 20. Courts had previously applied, by analogy, the
period from the writ of right to prescription. Id.

98. Stoebuck places this innovation at the beginning of the seventeenth century. Id.
99. Id. at 20-21. Originally "long usage" was sufficient to raise the presumption, but
after the 1623 modification of the limitation on ejectment actions to 20 years, the period
of user necessary for a presumption of lost grant was set at 20 years. Id.

DUKE LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 43:845

During the nineteenth century, the rebuttable presumption of
a grant became "irrebuttable" inasmuch as courts transformed the
evidentiary presumption into a rule of law that vested title in the
prescriber."o In 1832, Lord Tenterden's Acte1 supplemented
the common law doctrine of prescription by mandating, inter alia,
twenty years user for prescriptive easements and certain water
rights before a presumption of grant could arise. The statute also
made these
prescriptive interests indefeasible if enjoyed for forty
2
years.1
The history of prescription tracks a practice in search of a
doctrine; the practice developed before a justification could be
found, and Parliament never explicitly dealt with the subject. This
failure left courts with the uncomfortable task of refining the
doctrine. The English courts developed the fictional lost grant as a
doctrinal justification for prescription, but the subsequent legislative actions modifying the requirements of prescription failed to
displace the judicially created fiction. William Stoebuck, one of the
few scholars who has discussed the problem of lost grant theory,
has observed that the presumption of a grant cannot be considered "the basis or origin of prescription."' 3 American courts,
however, have erroneously seen it as the basis not only of prescription but also of adverse possession."
American courts extended the use of lost, or presumptive,
grants to the realm of adverse possession and, thus, to corporeal
interests. 05 In so doing, the courts allowed the doctrine of presumed grant, devised as a judicial means of allowing prescription
to resemble the legislative legitimacy of adverse possession, to
become a justification for adverse possession in American law.
Having searched for a justification for the pragmatic doctrine of
allowing individual possessors and users to gain title to land and
interests, the common law only produced a fiction that continues

100. Id. at 21 (citing WInLIAM S. HOLDSWORTH, AN HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION TO
THE LAND LAW 283 (1927)). Stoebuck notes that "the presumption could be kept from
operating by showing that the facts necessary to raise it had not existed; i.e., that there
had been no user for twenty years or that the user had not been uninterrupted, notorious, or hostile to the owner." Id. at 21-22.
101. Prescription Act, 1832, 2 &.3 Will. 4, ch. 71.
102. Id.
103. Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 22-23.
104. Id.
105. See id. at 27-31.
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to confuse both courts and commentators.3 6 The lost grant doctrine has become, in the late twentieth century, an embarrassing
illegitimate child of prescriptive law. It is both the misuse of and
the disdain for this fiction that postmodern analysis can illuminate.
III.

POSTMODERN ANALYSIS: EMBRACING THE FICTION

Although twentieth century courts have increasingly viewed
the lost grant doctrine as an antiquated remnant of medieval legal
thought,"° the Utah Supreme Court, in Big Cottonwood Tanner
Ditch Co. v. Moyle,"~relied on the lost grant doctrine to justify
the law of prescription. A postmodern analysis of the ensuing
debate in this jurisdiction reveals that there is more at stake than
"a fictionalized rationale for the result of the rule."" ° Indeed,
the strident opposition to the fictional lost grant demonstrates that
courts and commentators distrust a legal theory that intimates the
fictional nature of property ownership.
Big Cottonwood has been cited as an example of how American courts have misconstrued the doctrine of presumed grant by
viewing it as the theoretical basis of prescription.1 ' Despite any
conceptual misunderstandings, Big Cottonwood took an anachronistic approach with its expansive use of the lost grant doctrine; it
celebrated the fiction as sound doctrine, whereas twentieth century
courts and commentators have generally looked on the lost grant
doctrine with suspicion or even disdain."' This trend in Ameri-

106. See infra Section IM(A).
107. See infra Section' III(B).
108. 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946).
109. Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 24.
110. Id. at 18 & n.3. The fictional lost grant doctrine developed as an ancillary rationale, after prescription was already an accepted means of acquiring a property interest
through long-continued user. Id.
111. The lost grant doctrine is generally disfavored, and courts often state that statutes of limitations provide the exclusive foundation for creating property rights through
trespass. See e.g., Dilliugham Commercial Co. v. City of Dillingham, 705 P.2d 410, 416
(Alaska 1985); Orange Blossom Hills, Inc. v. Kearsley, 299 So. 2d 75, 76-77 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1974); Garrett v. Gray, 266 A.2d 21, 27 (Md. 1970); Bridle Trail Ass'n v.
O'Shanick, 290 S.W.2d 401, 406-06 (Mo. Ct. App. 1956); Plaza v. Flak, 81 A.2d 137, 139
(NJ. 1951); Keebler v. Street, 673 S.W.2d 154, 156-57 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1984); Clark v.
Aqua Terra Corp., 329 A.2d 666, 668 (Vt. 1974).
Similar disdain is shown by academics, who dismiss the doctrine in their textbooks.
See, e.g., OLIN L. BROWDER, JR. ET AL., BASIC PROPERTY LAW 586 n.4 (4th ed. 1984);
CHARLES DONAHUE ET AL., PROPERTY 142 n.2 (1983).
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can law is illustrated by a line of Utah cases beginning with the
appeal in Big Cottonwood.
A. One Jurisdiction'sInterpretive Debate
Big Cottonwood, as a discussion of the theoretical justification
for prescriptive easements, provides an excellent context for examining how modem courts have dealt with the lost grant because
almost half a century of subsequent reinterpretation has slowly
shaped the disputed context of the lost grant doctrine. The case
was actually a rehearing of a prior case on the same facts,'
involving an irrigation company's attempt to cement ditches running across the defendants' land. In its first decision, the Utah
Supreme Court found that a lower court erred in holding that the
plaintiff's proposal to change earthen ditches, which the plaintiff
held by prescriptive easements, into cement ditches would not, for
various reasons, "result in a material increase in the burden on
the servient estates." ' The ditches ran through expensive, but
arid, residential real estate. The court found that cementing the
ditches would kill nearby vegetation and create a greater hazard
for children. Because both factors would lower the developmental
potential of the land," the court decided that such action would
be outside the scope of the prescriptive easemdnt." 5
On rehearing, a new majority reversed, 6 changing both the
outcome and the nature of the debate by altering the interpretation given to the fictional lost grant. Justice Wolfe, writing for the
new majority, noted that cementing the ditches actually eliminated
an incidental benefit, rather than increasing a material burden." 7
This change in reasoning was based on the reinterpretation of
effects flowing from the proposed change in the prescriptive easement: vegetation growing on residential property would inevitably
die in the absence of seepage from the earthen ditches.1 Although, under the English common law, a prescriptive easement
could be terminated if the incidental benefits ceased, the court
112. See Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Moyle, 159 P.2d 596 (Utah 1945),
modified on reh'g, 174 P.2d 148 (Utah 1946).
113. Id. at 599.
114. Id. at 596-97.
115. Id. at 599.
116. See Big Cottonwood, 174 P.2d at 162.
117. Id. at 151-52.
118. Id. at 151.
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noted that "[tihe needs of the people of this state ... are materially different from the needs of England."" 9
The court cited these differences as the reason that "[t]he
common law of Utah presumes that at the time of this grant all
parties concerned, knowing of the arid nature of this country,
contemplated that at some future time the owner of the water
[would modify the structures to prevent waste]."'" The court
found it reasonable to conclude that both parties contemplated the
ard nature of the land, as well as the potential for ditch improvement. Further, the court utilized this presumed contemplation as a
means of ascertaining the terms of the lost grant. The court refused to allow the servient estate to claim an interest in the seepage water because "the common law of Utah would not read into
the prescriptive use that content. '12' Thus, not only was the
grant lost, but the court was able to ascertain its contents. Further,
the court held that the burdens that a servient owner could enjoin
were burdens over and above "those embraced within the framework of the easement itself."'" The court thus declined to enjoin the proposed change to the ditches."
Within the confines of this holding, Justice Wolfe made an
impassioned argument for the fictional lost grant.
Before I could agree to sweep away the foundation .... I must
be convinced that it has become outmoded and useless as the
logical basis for... prescriptive easements. We cannot discard
the theory in part and retain it in part. We cannot when it is
necessary logically to support some phase or rule of that law,
invoke the theory but discard it in favor of some supposedly
more realistic theory when our purposes do not seem to require
it. I am not yet so convinced.... The law has texture and continuity. That was the genius of the common law. The old masters
on the bench were able to interpret it as a continuously developing and evolving system with principles inter-related and connected .... We must be sure that in pulling a master strand in this
fabric that we do not destroy the fabric itself. The Legislature
may, if acting constitutionally, do that.... [T]he old judges
preserved the logic of the law by what are sometimes called fic-

119.
120.
121.
122.
123.

Id. at 152.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 158.
Id. at 161.
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tions but seldom at the cost of substance. This was their method
of keeping the law logical and yet making it serve the needs of
the people. 24

This plea for tradition was countered by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Larson, who argued that the fictional lost
grant,
being without basis in fact and without necessity in law, should
be utterly disregarded .... It is merely a legal tower of Babel,

which leads to a confusion of tongues. Law should be more realistic-it should stand on its own feet, supported only by its necessity, its reasonableness, and its logic. Whatever may have

[been] the seeming necessity in the beginning for the fiction of
assuming a grant, it no longer exists.'2
Chief Justice Larson concluded that "in this day[,] in our law,
prescriptive rights are founded upon adverse possession and not
upon presumed grants."'"
These two contradictory views form the disputed context within the undisputed law of prescription. One senses an interpretive
constraint based on history in Justice Wolfe's opinion and an interpretive constraint based on rationality in Chief Justice Larson's
opinion. Subsequent reinterpretations' 7 of this debate, however,
would determine the accepted theoretical assumptions behind the
law of prescription in Utah.
Although a majority failed to join in the part of Justice
Wolfe's opinion dealing with the lost grant doctrine,"2 subsequent courts did not disturb his reasoning-at least not overtly. A
decade later, in Harvey v. Haights Bench Irrigation Co., 9 the
same Utah court confronted a remarkably similar appeal. Noting
that "[Big Cottonwood] plagues us ... by what was said that was

not necessary to the decision," the court observed that no opinion
in Big Cottonwood garnered more than two votes. 3 ' After this
criticism, the court produced an analysis that would hold regardless

124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
wood,
129.
130.

Id. at 153.
Id. at 162 (Larson, CJ., concurring).
Id. at 163.
See infra notes 129-140 and accompanying text.
Only one justice concurred in both the judgment and the reasoning. Big Cotton174 P.2d at 162.
318 P.2d 343 (Utah 1957).
Id. at 346-47.

1994]

POSTMODERNISM AND THE LOST GRANT

869

of whether the justices accepted the lost grant theory or based the
right to change the easement's use "in the interest of conservation
and public policy."'' The court clearly had misgivings about Big
Cottonwood, but it did not repudiate the lost grant doctrine. 32
A decade later, in Richins v. Struhs,33 the court spoke, in
the context of prescriptive rights, of the "general policy of the law
of assuring the peace and good order of society by leaving a longestablished status quo at rest rather than by disturbing it."" The
court wrote further that
[i]t is appreciated that this lost grant theory is fictional. But the
theory upon which the presumption rests is not important. Whatever theory it may be based upon, what is significant is that it
has a well justified and salutary purpose which is in conformity
with the policy just discussed; and that it is so well established in
our law that its validity is no longer open to question. 3 '

The opinion analyzed the prescription dispute in light of the law
of adverse possession.'36 Thus, the theoretical assumptions regarding the practice of prescription became part of Utah law
through successful acts of persuasion by practitioners and jurists;
the court chose not to grapple with the theory behind the practice.
Several years later, the same court stated, in the context of an
action to quiet title, "that the policy of encouraging peace and
good order and of discouraging trouble and controversy demands
[acceptance] as the correct doctrine and that it need not depend
upon rationalization as to ideas of estoppel, presumed agreements,
lost grants or other fictional concepts."' 37 Then, in a 1981 decision, Jensen v. Brown,3 ' the Utah Supreme Court finally found a
prescriptive easement without any mention of the fictional lost
grant theory. The court relied on traditional adverse possession

131. Id. at 348.
132. See id. at 349. The court emphasized that Justice Wade's pragmatically oriented
opinion in Big Cottonwood "sets out the true basis" for determining the suitability of
changes in easement use. Id. The decision, however, proceeded to discuss the facts of the
case in the context of analyzing the terms of a lost grant. Id. at 349-50.
133. 412 P.2d 314 (Utah 1966).
134. Id. at 315.
135. Id.
136. Id. at 316-17. In other words, the inquiry was whether the use was "open, notorious, continuous, and adverse for more than 20 years." Id. at 317.
137. Olsen v. Park Daughters Inv. Co., 511 P.2d 145, 147 (Utah 1973).
138. 639 P.2d 150 (Utah 1981).
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analysis, the interpretation of the traditional terms, "open, notorious, adverse, and continuous [use] for a period of 20 years," to ascertain the existence of a prescriptive easement. 139 The metaphorical conception of a lost grant was replaced by reliance on a more
mechanical approach,1" and terms of art within the framework
of adverse possession became the accepted discourse surrounding
prescription.
These changes in the assumptions behind prescription resulted
in a changing interpretive constraint; in Utah, the rational constraint of Chief Justice Larson prevailed. The acts of persuasion
that led to these changes in assumptions, and thus interpretive
constraint, must have come from a changing society as well as the
preceding opinions. After all, the presumption of a lost grant arose
in a time when science postulated a solar system rotating around a
flat earth, when divine right determined politics, and when leeches
fought reliably against disease. Fictions seem somehow out of context in a modem society intent on enacting public policies and
mechanical rules.
B. Animosity Against Fiction or Prescription?
Although Big Cottonwood was never overruled, its proposition
that the lost grant doctrine was a vital component of prescription
gradually fell from favor. These later cases reflect a change in the
assumptions about the law. Enlightenment rationality, as reflected
by the judicial response to Big Cottonwood, is uncomfortable with
the lost grant doctrine. According to the doctrine's detractors, this
discomfort has arisen because the doctrine builds on a fiction.
Although relatively few academics have devoted attention to the
doctrine, one mid-twentieth century commentary stated that "[t]he
fiction of a lost grant is quite distasteful to the modem mind, '4
and another found weakness in the doctrine because "it is a palpa14 2
ble and contrived fiction.
Earlier in the century, one writer suggested to American
courts that an analogy to the statute of limitations was preferable

139. Id. at 152.

140.
guished
1946)).
141.
142.

Adverse, for example, was defined as "use ... against the owner as distinfrom under the owner." Id. (quoting Zollinger v. Frank, 175 P.2d 714, 715 (Utah
2 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 8.51 (A. James Casner ed., 1952).
Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 33.
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to the doctrine of the lost grant because "[s]uch a rule has the
merit not only of attaining fairer results, but also of being based
upon fact rather than upon fiction.' 141 Several decades later, J.W.
Simonton followed closely on the same theme by arguing that the
"admitted fiction" of lost grant doctrine had "gathered a lot of
barnacles, which serve to slow down and clog the administration of
justice."'144 Within the interpretive community of American jurists, these and other arguments succeeded in classifying the doctrine of lost grant as a disputed context' 45 within the undisputed
context of prescription." 4 In other words, everybody agreed that
property rights could be acquired through prescription, but opinions varied as to the theory justifying the acquisition. Eventually,
the lost grant fell from favor. The interpretive hierarchy was set:
prescription by analogy to adverse possession became regarded as
a favored conception, a privileged term, whereas prescription by
lost grant was dismissed as a mere fiction.
1. Deconstructing the Arguments. Opponents of the lost
grant raised two objections. They argued, first, that the conditions
necessary to raise the inference of a grant were needlessly complex
and, second, that the presumption was not a true presumption because the grant was admittedly a fiction. 147 These arguments

against prescription by analogy to lost grant apply equally well to
prescription by analogy to adverse possession. Postmodern analysis
can unground the preferred conception of prescription by analogy
to adverse poisession by inverting this interpretive hierarchy."4
The first argument against prescription by lost grant attacks
the conditions necessary for prescriptive use. The "barnacles"
Simonton referred to were terms of art, such as "exclusive" and

143. Note, Doctrine of Lost Grant, 16 HARV. L. REv. 438, 439 (1903).
144. J.W. Simonton, Fictional Lost Grant in Prescription-ANocuous Archaism, 35 W.

VA. L.Q. & B. 46, 50 (1928). Simonton wrote further that "courts frankly admit they are
applying the statute of limitations by analogy. It is therefore time the whole archaic
structure was swept away and the simple straight-forward course adopted. The courts of
some jurisdictions have done this and no apparent disaster has followed such radicalism."
Id.
145. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text.
146. Even today, nobody doubts the ability to gain property interests through prescription, but the lost grant doctrine is still disfavored. See supra note 111 and accompanying
text.
147. See infra notes 149-57 and accompanying text.
148. See supra subsection I(B)(1).
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"acquiescence," which were required to raise the evidentiary presumption that a grant had been lost.149 William Stoebuck has
noted, however, that adverse possession began by blending the
prescriptive elements into the law to allow possessory acquisition
of property; indeed, "the elements [of adverse possessionJ 'actual,
open, notorious, exclusive, continuous, and hostile[,]' smell suspiciously of Coke's characterization of prescriptive user, 'long, continual, and peaceable.""" The terms of art required to raise a
presumption of lost grant are very similar to the terms of art required to justify adverse possession. The elements comprising a
theory of prescription by analogy to the law of adverse possession
therefore bear the same linguistic heritage"' as the elements necessary to raise a presumption of lost grant. This common linguistic
heritage demands that courts make similar interpretations based on
similar terms of art.
Subsequent interpretations have modified the terminology
required to acquire property by prescription, but surely
prescription's terminology cannot be a justification for abolishing
the lost grant, since adverse possession has a similar list of conditions. Furthermore, these conditions are equally mystifying to those
who must interpret them. These terms have become so frustrating
because they are signs (or signifiers) that represent one concept
(or signified) in ordinary usage and another in legal context. 52
In other words, they have become terms of art that courts can use
to formulate judicial interpretations. This judicial reliance on terms
of art, however, is the norm in both adverse possession and prescription. The conceptual theory behind prescription does not
change the fundamental acts of interpretation that a court must
perform. Prescription by analogy to adverse possession has just as

149.

See Simonton, supra note 144, at 50-51.

150. Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 32 (citing COKE, supra note 91, at *113b.).
151. One sees the linguistic interdependence, or diffirance, of these words when it is
understood that prescription's terms of art became a justification for adverse possession,
and those who dislike the fictional lost grant now seek to infuse these same terms into
prescription to give it legitimacy.
152. Words such as "adverse" can mean one thing in common usage and quite another when used as terms of art intended to raise some kind of evidentiary presumption.
153. Simonton noted that "exclusive" often does not mean exclusive, but rather proprietary, and "consent" does not require consent or permission, but means rather that the

landowner did not object. See Simonton, supra note 144, at 50-51; see also Note, supra
note 143, at 439 (noting the ironic use of "acquiescence" and "interruption" in prescriptive law).
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many barnacles clogging the system and making interpretation difficult as does prescription by analogy to lost grant. The arguments
against the lost grant can be said to undo themselves when it is
seen that they apply equally well to prescription by analogy as to
adverse possession. This reversal shows that there must be some
deeper mistrust of the doctrine.
Another argument against the lost grant doctrine criticizes the
presumption raised by adverse user. Commentators attack the
presumption because it presumes something openly fictional.
Simonton argued that the "so-called means of rebutting the presumption do not rebut it, but all of them attack the facts from
which the presumption arises and tend to prove the proper facts
do not exist."'" Because the factual basis of the grant could not
be attacked, Simonton argued that "the presumption of a lost
grant is not a true presumption, because the thing presumed is
admittedly a fiction-is admittedly not true in a majority of cases."' 55 For Simonton, proof of adverse user "does not justify the
inference that there was a grant of the easement which has been
lost.' 1 6 He objected to the presumption because evidence that a
grant was never made cannot be introduced; evidence about the
character of the user is the only evidence that is admissible. Inability to consider factual evidence concerning the grant, he argued,
undermines the presumption because it was a presumption of a
grant that was completely fictional.5 7
The same argument, however, may be used against prescription by analogy to adverse possession. If, as the lost grant
doctrine's detractors argue, proof of adverse user does not justify
the inference of a grant, then one might rightfully question what
type of inference is justified. It appears that the detractors believe
that proof of user justifies a decision based on a set of adverse
possession's terms, even if these terms were actually derived from
and very similar to the terminology used to infer the existence of
a grant and thereby satisfy the requirements of prescription. The
argument against the fiction denigrates the presumption of a grant,

154. Simonton, supra note 144, at 50.
155. Id. at 48.
156. Id.
157. British courts have encountered this same problem in applying their own common
law. Evidence to rebut the user, but not evidence to rebut the grant, is admissible. Alan
Dowling, Note, Lost Grants and Registered Deeds, 43 N. IR.LEGAL Q. 53, 53-54 (1992).
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but Simonton's argument necessarily relies on a presumption that
fulfilling the requirements of adverse possession justifies the transfer of property. With or without the presumption of lost grant,
there is no difference in outcome. The dissatisfaction, therefore,
appears to be focused on the artificial nature of the fictional grant,
rather than on the logical weakness of the evidentiary rules.
2. Interpreting the Constraint. In addition to showing how
these arguments against the lost grant doctrine deconstruct,
postmodernism also casts light on the interpretational process and
reveals the equally fictitious nature of the rational approaches
advocated in place of the lost grant doctrine. In liberating the text
from the author and questioning the simple paradigm of legal interpretation,158 postmodernism can displace the idea that correct
interpretations follow the author's intent and incorrect interpretations miss the author's intent. Thus, although there was no intent
to grant the property right, the lost grant theory can be accorded
equal footing with other theories regardless of the parties' intent-it is a conceptual model that serves as a metaphor, an arbiter of competing interests. There is always a divergence between
intent and the actual signs and metaphors of a text. A conceptual
model serves a relevant purpose and is just as valid, even if it is
not as easily perceptible as a mechanical test such as prescription
by analogy to adverse possession.
That mechanical test, however, became the accepted means of
understanding prescription because the interpretive community of
American lawyers, jurists, and academicians finally accepted a
"rational" interpretive constraint that disfavored the lost grant
theory.'59 The "meaning" of prescription, determined by the
community's innate structure of beliefs, 60 gradually changed.
This analysis of interpretation not only explains the process of historical development but also implies the possibility of future
change. Interpretive constraints of the future need not perpetuate
the philosophical bias of Enlightenment rationality.
Interpretive constraint, although itself a mediating force, may
yet transform under the influence of postmodernism. If
postmodernism influences the structure of beliefs innate to Ameri-

158. See supra subsection I(B)(2).
159. See supra notes 129-40 and accompanying text.
160. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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can legal thought, hostility to metaphor and symbol will dissipate.
In the subsequent reinterpretations of Big Cottonwood, modernism
pushed aside the lost grant doctrine and replaced it with rules that
appear more rational. Postmodern analysis, however, can expose
the equally fictitious nature of modernism's rational rules.
3. Drawing Conclusions. The deconstruction of modem
assumptions about prescription brings us back, in a sense, to where
we began. The interpretive hierarchy has been reversed. Arguments against prescription by analogy to lost grant have been
shown to apply equally well to prescription by analogy to adverse
possession. Once the preferred conception has been ungrounded,
there remains to be seen what insights this ungrounding might
offer. The objections to prescription by lost grant appear to be
focused on the fictional nature of the doctrine; this fiction contrasts with a view of property law characterized by mechanical
rules. To "rational" minds, mechanical rules imply legitimacy.
Ownership of property or property rights appears more legitimate
when justified by mechanical approaches.
Advocating just such an approach, Simonton sought to show
that prescription by lost grant had become, in effect, just like
adverse possession. He wrote that "[t]he reluctance of the English
courts to admit they were actually making law, seemingly caused
them to adopt the fiction and thus pretend they were merely applying law already existing."'' The lost grant doctrine, however,
probably found its origin in efforts to justify prescription, rather
than in efforts to obscure reasoning. Judges created the common
law, it seems unlikely that they would invent the lost grant doctrine out of a desire to deny their hand in legal creation. Because
theories of prescription seem to be efforts at cloaking the property
transfer in legitimacy, a discomfort with prescription in general is a
more likely antecedent of the fictional lost grant.
One sees this discomfort in the history of prescription. The
fictional lost grant developed after prescription was already an
established practice.162 Both courts and legislatures danced
around prescription without ever coming to conclusive answers

161. Simonton, supra note 144, at 50.
162. See supra Section 1(B). Additionally, Parliament's 1832 act, called Lord
Tenterden's Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4, ch. 71, failed to do anything more than supplement this
common law practice. See supra text accompanying note 101.
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about its doctrinal basis.1 63 Beneath the surface, the same discomfort motivates detractors of the fiction in our own time.
This discomfort arises because awarding property rights is, in
and of itself, a construct-a fiction. Dirt, rocks, and ditches only
become "property" when the law symbolically sanctions "ownership." Without this legal sanction, only brute force would ensure
property ownership. The judges and legislators of prior times needed a rationale for their pragmatic practice of awarding interests in
land to those who used it for a significant amount of time. The
lost grant theory fit well as a justification for the transaction. The
distrust subsequently aimed at the fictional lost grant seems to
posit reality as an appropriate counterpart to fiction. In this artificial hierarchy, reality is a privileged conception and the fictional
construct is disfavored. This opposition to fiction may be explained
by Derrida's metaphysics of presence because his philosophical
conception discerns philosophical bias in our attempts to privilege
the ideas that seem most immediately perceptible.1 4
Modernism does not view the fictional construct as the most
obvious approach, but prescription, sanctioning property acquisition
through trespass, requires that courts indulge in fiction. In this
sense, property rights are not objectively real-they are legal fictions placed over possession and use for the sake of ensuring
domestic tranquility. Fiction and reality, however, both bear traces
of each other because each word is implicit in the other word's
definition.1" When we hold reality before our mind, we know
that it is not fiction, and when we hold fiction before our mind,
we know that it is not reality. The diff~rance,1 6 or mutual dependence, of these terms is apparent. As has been argued, however, legal reality in the sense of property rights is a fictional construct. Postmodern legal theory allows a fiction to be accorded just
as much legitimacy as legal "reality."
Postmodern approaches to law readily acknowledge its fictional nature, but modern minds want a mechanical law that, through
objective reality, smoothly accomplishes its purpose. To them, the
lost grant theory appears to be excess theoretical baggage that
detracts from the mechanics. They do not want to think that there

163.
164.
165.
166.

See
See
See
See

supra text accompanying notes 103.
supra note 40 and accompanying text.
supra note 43 and accompanying text.
supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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might be a certain level of incongruence between their language
and their intention or between a law's justification and its application. The reality is that there was no grant, but one also might
argue that another reality is that our conception of property ownership is a construct just like the lost grant. Allowing adverse user
(itself a term of art) to become a property right is a pragmatic
necessity in our society; but to dismiss a mechanism for accomplishing this result as a fiction strikes an ironic chord.167
This irony should not be lost on courts, academics, or practitioners. Perhaps openly acknowledging the presence of fiction in
legal endeavor would facilitate more open discourse and lead to
greater equity. Those who deny fictions by advocating mechanical
approaches should reevaluate the reasons behind their distaste for
metaphorical conceptions such as the lost grant. Understanding the
utility of a perspective enriched by the lost grant allows legal
practitioners to look deeper into' the process in which they are
engaged.
The law is now centuries from livery of seisin,168 but that
practice, which symbolized possession, may be an appropriate
comparison to the lost grant. Modernism sees symbolic rites as
archaic and fictional acquisitions as superfluous, but postmodernism can posit these conceptual models as equally valid alternatives. Prescription involves analysis of terms of art and can
take on the aura of a mechanical process. Removing the fiction as
a conceptual model pushes the reasoning for the transfer into a
purely linguistic realm and therefore makes the property transfer
appear more rational and legitimate. The fiction, however, is more
honest. Nobody would advocate a return to medieval ritual, but
perhaps those who practiced the rituals could better understand
that ownership is a symbolic fiction that we place over possession.
Although the modern mind is more comfortable with ownership,
possession and ownership are two signifiers that represent the

167. Irony may be the defining quality of the lost grant doctrine. Either attacking or
supporting the doctrine appears ironic when the arguments are undermined. One "writer
has observed that, in modem British common law, the effect of mistake on the element
of acquiescence remains important, although the grant is presumed. See Hudson, supra
note 75, at 356-60.
168. Prior to 1536, a freehold estate could be transferred only through a ceremonial
ritual known as a feoffment with livery of seisin. This rite required the grantor and
grantee to enter the land, with witnesses, to exchange a twig, a clod of dirt, or a key as
a symbolic transfer of the property. See DUKEMINmR & KRIER, supra note 74, at 394.
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same signified. Because it reveals the unstable nature of language
and signification, postmodern analysis shows that ownership and
possession are metaphors inside a complex, symbolic structure of
fictional concepts.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Even if we deny them, fictions nonetheless surround us. An
objective view of the world based on scientific rationalism strives
to eliminate ambiguity, but only at the price of creating more
subtle fictions. Ownership is one such fiction, as is the acquisition
of property rights through prescription. Although modernism has
eliminated the lost grant doctrine from the conceptual framework
of prescription, postmodernism reveals the equally fictional nature
of the remaining structures. The fictional lost grant accomplished
the same purpose as reasoning by analogy to the elements of adverse possession,169 but even according to the standards of Enlightenment rationality, it had the advantage of openly admitting
its contrivance. The mechanical rules of adverse possession give
the appearance of rationality, but they are structures for interpretation just as much as any elements of prescription; they appear
cleaner only because they purport to build on a solid foundation
instead of a fiction.
Postmoderism allows the theory of prescription by analogy to
lost grant to be accorded just as much validity as its alternative. 7 ' The lost grant doctrine makes overt that which modernism strives to subvert; despite rational, scientific thought and organized legal structures, we are surrounded by fiction. Viewed
through a postmodern lens, our objective construct of ownership is
undermined by subjective insights into its fictional nature. Shakespeare evoked this clash between objective and subjective perspectives with his proposition that mere thought could make Denmark
a prison. He surely would be dismayed, however, by a modern
world that cannot admit its fiction. This is a prison of the mind.

169. See Stoebuck, supra note 88, at 31.
170. One legal scholar has argued that the lost grant doctrine should be accepted,
even in modem practice, because it fills four conceptual holes: claims to government
lands, claims against future interests, claims founded on interrupted possession or use,
and claims against concurrent owners. See Jerome J. Curtis, Jr., Reviving the Lost Grant,
23 REAL PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 535, 548-58 (1988).

